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Summary 
Scholarly interest in the co-existence of normative orders in African social
fields tends to focus on conflicts arising from the interaction of customary
law with state law. This article takes a different path by revealing the
normative influence of state law on actors involved in matrimonial
property division outside the courts in Southern Nigeria. Based on
individual interviews and focus group discussions with female divorcees,
their parents, clergy, traditional leaders, NGOs and social welfare officials,
it analyses inequalities in property division under customary law, arguing
that these inequalities often lead to ‘dignity takings’. It reveals how the
Social Welfare Department, a government agency mandated to champion
the interests of women and children, plays a prominent role in the
privileging of gender, class and women’s dignity. Spurred by statutes, this
department increasingly orders men to divide matrimonial property and/
or to pay compensation to women. Its quasi-judicial orders on marriage
gifts, properties bought by women, and child custody potentially
contribute to ‘dignity restoration’ for women infantilised by the customary
law of matrimonial property. By revealing the driving forces behind shifts
in the traditional philosophy of matrimonial property, the article
demonstrates how non-judicial dialogue between state law and
customary law facilitates a living customary law of marital property
division in Southern Nigeria. 
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1 Introduction 
Legal pluralism in Africa is generally regarded as the co-existence of
international, state, customary and religious laws within a population
or social field.1 Academic interest in this co-existence tends to focus
on the conflicts arising from customary law’s interaction with the
transplanted European laws that developed into state law.2 This
interest is understandable, given the problems caused by the
wholesale transplantation of relatively sophisticated European laws
into agrarian political economies. As Merry observed, ‘the imposed
law, forged for industrial capitalism rather than an agrarian or pastoral
way of life, embodied very different principles and procedures …
[and] overlooked, to a large extent, the complexity of previous legal
orders’.3 Arguably, this complexity is partly traceable to the close link
between customary law and the foundational values which prompt,
inform and guide the manner in which people apply customs.
Unfortunately, judges and policy makers do not pay sufficient
attention to these values.4 For example, customary law heirs inherited
property alongside duties such as care for a deceased’s dependants
and the preservation of the ancestral home.5 However, when
interpreting customary law, judges applied formal rules of inheritance
without their foundational duties, sometimes relying on distorted
versions of customs presented by chiefs and headmen.6 Codified
customs, textual descriptions and judicial precedents became known
as official customary law, raising conflict of law problems that
encouraged an antipodal approach to legal pluralism.7 In a marked
departure from mainstream scholarship, this article primarily aims to
reveal dialogue between state law and customary law in the context
1 GR Woodman ‘Legal pluralism in Africa: The implications of state recognition of
customary laws illustrated from the field of land law’ in H Mostert & T Bennett
(eds) Pluralism and development: Studies in access to property in Africa (2012);
PS Berman Global legal pluralism: A jurisprudence of law beyond borders (2012).
2 See, eg, M Pieterse ‘Killing it softly: Customary law in the new constitutional
order’ (2000) 33 De Jure 35; A Hellum ‘Human rights and gender relations in post-
colonial Africa: Options and limits for the subjects of legal pluralism’ (2000) 25
Law and Social Inquiry 635 at 637.
3 SE Merry ‘Legal pluralism’ (1988) 22 Law and Society Review 869.
4 AC Diala ‘Lessons from South Africa on reform of the customary law of inheritance
in Nigeria’ (2014) 14 African Human Rights Law Journal 633.
5 As above; C Fombad ‘Gender equality in African customary law: Has the male
ultimogeniture rule any future in Botswana?’ (2014) 52 Journal of Modern African
Studies 475.
6 L Mbatha ‘Reforming the customary law of succession’ (2002) 18 South African
Journal on Human Rights 259; Onyibor Anekwe & Another v Maria Nweke (2014) All
FWLR (Pt 739) 1154, Ukeje v Ukeje (2014) 11 NWLR (Pt 1418) 384-414; Bhe v
Magistrate Khayelitsha & Others 2005 (1) BCLR 1 (CC).
7 CN Himonga & C Bosch ‘The application of African customary law under the
Constitution of South Africa: Problems solved or just beginning’ (2000) 117 South
African Law Journal 319; TW Bennett ‘”Official” vs “living” customary law:
Dilemmas of description and recognition’ in A Claassens & B Cousins (eds) Land,
power and custom: Controversies generated by South Africa’s Communal Land Rights
Act (2008); J Bekker & GJ van Niekerk ‘Broadening the divide between official and
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of matrimonial property division outside the courts. Two arguments
accompany my aim. 
First, although I acknowledge the seriousness of conflict of laws, I
believe that legal pluralism in Africa is adaptive in nature. Accordingly,
it should be approached from the perspective of dialogue between
state law and customary law. This belief is informed by my empirical
evidence, which reveals state law’s considerable influence on the
normative behaviour of individuals who observe customary law.
Interestingly, this influence transcends the decisions and
pronouncements of courts in Southern Nigeria. An example of this
influence is the best interests of the child principle, which I discuss in
part four of the article.
Second, customary law’s denial of women’s matrimonial property
rights during divorce fits the bourgeoning jurisprudence of ‘dignity
takings’. The notion of dignity takings is a relatively recent entrant
into socio-legal theory. It developed from Atuahene’s striking book We
want what’s ours: Learning from South Africa’s land restitution program.8
This book portrays the colonial and apartheid era land dispossessions
in South Africa as dignity takings as they involved not only deprivation
of property but also dignity. It further argues that South Africa’s
attempts at confronting the underlying dehumanisation, infantilisation
and political exclusion that underpinned land dispossessions is a
‘dignity restoration’ measure, which transcends the usual remedy of
providing compensation for physical property losses.9 In a later
contribution Atuahene conceptualised dignity takings as ‘when a state
directly or indirectly destroys or confiscates property rights from
owners or occupiers and the intentional or unintentional outcome is
dehumanisation or infantilisation’.10 I argue that the denial of
women’s matrimonial property rights during divorce results in dignity
takings as it ignores women’s economic agency and capacity to make
informed decisions regarding their contributions to matrimonial
property. By revealing how a government agency navigates the
customary law power inequalities that inform dignity takings in
matrimonial property disputes, I explore whether the interventions of
this agency fit the notion of ‘dignity restoration’. 
While it is relatively easy to conceptualise dignity takings beyond
land dispossessions, it is difficult to conceptualise dignity restoration.
Historically, those at the receiving end of property dispossessions are
7 living customary law’ (2010) 73 Journal of Contemporary Roman-Dutch Law 679;
JC Bekker & IP Maithufi ‘The dichotomy between “official customary law” and
“non-official customary law”’ (1992) 17 Journal for Juridical Science 47; M Pieterse
‘Reform of the South African customary law of succession: Final nails in the
customary law coffin?’ in J Fenrich et al The future of customary law (2011) 336.
8 B Atuahene We want what’s ours: Learning from South Africa’s land restitution
program (2014).
9 Atuahene (n 8) 796.
10 B Atuahene ‘Takings as a socio-legal concept: An interdisciplinary examination of
involuntary property loss’ (2016) 12 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 171
at 178.
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poor and vulnerable individuals, who are often victims of conquests,
conflicts, colonialism and apartheid. More recently, communism and
capitalism, which often masquerade as wealth distribution and a free
market, respectively, have contributed to property dispossession
under the legal banner of public purpose and just compensation.
However, although ‘material compensation is an appropriate remedy’
in most property dispossessions, it ‘is not enough’ because the victims
lose ‘more than their property – they [are] also deprived of their
dignity’.11 Atuahene argues that ‘the appropriate remedy for a dignity
taking is “dignity restoration”’, which she defines as a ‘remedy that
seeks to provide dispossessed individuals and communities with
material compensation through processes that affirm their humanity
and reinforce their agency’.12 To achieve adequate dignity
restoration, therefore, remedies for dignity takings must be articulated
through mechanisms that respect the individuals who are harmed by
such takings, thereby affirming their humanity and agency.
In extrapolating the notion of dignity takings to the customary law
of matrimonial property in Southern Nigeria, I argue that dignity
takings occur on two fronts. The first, which does not directly involve
the state, occurs when men rely on customary law to rob women of
matrimonial property during divorce. Given that women directly and
indirectly contribute in the acquisition of marital property, denying
them a right to benefit from this property denies their status and
agency as equal partners in the marriage project. As I explain later,
this denial equates to the infantilisation of women. The second front
on which dignity takings occur is the non-existence of regulatory
conditions that enable divorcing women to claim marital property. To
limit and prevent dignity takings, married women must obtain agency
through matrimonial property legislation, and/or inclusion of
matrimonial property rights in the Nigerian Constitution. Such
legislative measures will affirm women’s status as property rights-
bearing individuals in cases of divorce, thereby affirming their agency
as decision-making adults. 
After explaining how dignity takings occur in marital property
division, I explore the notion of dignity restoration by showing how
state law is driving change in traditional perceptions of matrimonial
property rights. I demonstrate how the arbitral decisions of a
government agency mandated to protect the rights of women and
children are facilitating a living customary law of matrimonial
property. As a concept, living customary law is described in
mainstream literature as the flexible norms that govern people’s daily
lives, but is easier understood as the norms that emerge from people’s
adaptation of customs to socio-economic changes.13 These norms
11 Atuahene (n 8) 796.
12 Atuahene 818.
13 AC Diala ‘The concept of living customary law: A critique’ (2017) 49 Journal of
Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 143.
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may be contrasted with customs which people have not adapted to
socio-economic changes, which may be described as non-living
customary law.14 I argue that an ‘adaptation view’ of living customary
law is significant for the notions of dignity taking and dignity
restoration, since the application of customary law must keep pace
with contemporary ideas and attitudes. 
The article is informed by semi-structured interviews and focus
group discussions with 86 purposively selected female divorcees, their
parents, clergy, traditional leaders, non-governmental organisations
(NGOs), judges and social welfare officials. These surveys were held
between June 2014 and January 2015 in Southern Nigeria, a generally
homogenous, predominantly Christian area with a population of
approximately 30 million people.15 The surveys targeted individuals
operating in social fields in which the traditional philosophy of
customary law denies women’s matrimonial property rights. In fact, in
some of these social fields women are regarded as properties – that is
objects of inheritance through levirate marriage.16 In the context of
this traditional philosophy, they are unable to assert matrimonial
property rights. This philosophy, also referred to as non-living
customary law, is traceable to the agrarian social settings in which
customary law emerged. Two features of this social setting are worth
noting for the notion of dignity takings.
First, the concept of ‘family’ was usually expansive, since it
comprised not only spouses and their children, but also uncles,
nephews and cousins, all of whom worked as a unit to produce
property.17 Family property was very basic and, other than land,
chiefly consisted of communal huts, mats, livestock, economic trees,
fishing nets, ritual symbols, kitchen utensils and farming tools. There
were no modern gadgets such as cars, refrigerators, computers,
television sets and rented apartments. In this close-knit social setting,
inheritance was only through the eldest male child, followed by the
next senior son, failing which inheritance fell on uncles.18 This so-
called rule of male primogeniture automatically excluded women. It
was justified on the need for an authority figure (the family head) to
safeguard family assets and ensure the economic maintenance of
widows, unmarried daughters and teenage sons.19 This agrarian social
14 As above; AC Diala ‘Judicial recognition of living customary law in the context of
matrimonial property rights in South-East Nigeria’ PhD thesis, University of Cape
Town, 2016.
15 This is an estimated figure. The 2006 national census puts the region’s population
at 16,4 million.
16 CJ Korieh ‘Widowhood among the Igbo of Eastern Nigeria’ MA dissertation,
University of Bergen, 1996 ch 3.
17 CN Himonga ‘Property disputes in law and practice: Dissolution of marriage in
Zambia’ in A Armstrong & W Ncube (eds) Women and law in Southern Africa
(1987) 61-66.  
18 N Okoro The customary laws of succession in Eastern Nigeria and the statutory and
judicial rules governing their application (1966) 4-6.
19 As above.  
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setting birthed the customary law philosophy of non-matrimonial
property rights for women, a philosophy similar to feme covert. Also
called couverture or coverture, feme covert was a legal doctrine in
medieval Europe, in which a married woman’s legal rights and
liabilities were subsumed by her husband’s rights. As Blackstone
described it, 
the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the
marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the
husband, under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs
everything; and is therefore called … a feme covert.20 
After encountering this feme covert-like philosophy, colonial courts
created the official customary law that prevents women from exiting
marriage with properties other than their clothes and cooking
utensils.21 Considering contemporary settings of urbanisation,
sophisticated forms of household property, and women’s
contributions to property acquisition through their independent
income, adherence to this official customary law during divorce
amounts to the infantilisation of women.
The second feature of customary law’s agrarian origin is that the
woman physically leaves her community after the payment of her
bride wealth and joins the husband’s family. This movement, which
still largely exists, occurs in a manner that makes it clear that she is
subordinate to her husband.22 As Radcliff-Brown summarised it,
‘marriage involves some modification or partial rupture of the
relations between the bride and her immediate kin … and gives the
husband and his kin certain rights in relation to his wife and the
children she bears’.23 The woman’s relocation to a different family
setting brings her within the ambit and control of her husband’s
property rights in, as explained, a philosophy similar to feme covert.
Notably, up to the twentieth century, feme covert was applied in the
Anglo-American legal tradition with an accompanying duty of care
from the husband to the wife.24 In Nigeria, however, even though a
man’s duty to care for his family is a foundational value of customary
law,25 judges rarely utilise this duty to order maintenance or
compensation for women after divorce.26 Unable to assert
matrimonial property rights under customary law, and unprotected by
20 W Blackstone Commentaries on the laws of England, Vol 1 (1976) 443-445. 
21 SNC Obi et al The customary law manual (1977).
22 P Iroegbu Marrying wealth, marrying poverty: Gender and bride wealth power in an
African society: The Igbo of Nigeria (2007).  
23 AR Radcliffe-Brown & D Forde African systems of kinship and marriage (1950)
43-51.
24 H Hartog Man and wife in America: A history (2000) 146.
25 E Nwogugu Family law in Nigeria (2014) 59-60; FDI Jones Ibo and Ibibio-speaking
peoples of South-Eastern Nigeria (1950) 18; TO Elias Groundwork of Nigerian law
(1954) 288-289; SNC Obi Modern family law in Southern Nigeria (1966) 366-371.
26 Patriarchal perceptions of matrimonial property rights are the main reason for
judges’ reluctance to invoke this duty of care in Nigeria. See AC Diala ‘Legal
pluralism and social change: Insights from matrimonial property rights in Nigeria’
712                                                             (2018) 18 AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW JOURNAL
Nigeria’s legislative framework, women in the process of divorce are
routinely robbed of property. This robbery is shrouded in strong,
patriarchal gender relations, which denies married women’s economic
and emotional agency as contributors to matrimonial property
acquisition. The result of this denial is disrespect, dependence and
legal helplessness in divorcing women, which amounts to
infantilisation. 
Following this introduction, part 2 of the article applies the notions
of dignity taking and dignity restoration to matrimonial property
rights. In so doing, I attempt to overcome conceptual barriers to the
application of dignity takings to matrimonial property tussles in
Nigeria. Thereafter, I problematise the conceptualisation of dignity
restoration in context-specific cases involving non-state actors. In part
3 I introduce the Social Welfare Department, a government agency
statutorily mandated to protect the interests of women and children. I
identify this agency’s role in contestations over custody of children,
properties brought into marriage by women, and properties acquired
during the subsistence of marriage. In part 4 I innovatively analyse the
role of the Department in the privileging of gender, class and dignity
in matrimonial property. I situate the Department’s influence within a
legal pluralistic framework, one in which dialogue between customary
law and state law manifests in the Department’s quasi-judicial orders
on marital assets division, the custody of children and child and
spousal maintenance. I explore whether these orders contribute to
‘dignity restoration’ for women previously ignored by the non-living
customary law of matrimonial property. In part 5 I conclude by
drawing attention to the potential that dialogue between customary
law and state law holds for theoretical perspectives on legal
integration in Africa.
2 Dignity takings in matrimonial property disputes
Applying the notion of dignity takings to matrimonial property
disputes in Nigeria could face some conceptual barriers. First, it may
be asked whether dignity takings apply to the non-living customary
law of matrimonial property, especially in Southern Nigeria. To be
clear, two elements are required for a dignity taking to occur. These
are ‘involuntary property loss plus either dehumanisation or
infantilisation’.27 Underpinning these two elements is the concept of
dignity, of which the jurisprudence is well known. It suffices to identify
the two core components of dignity: ‘equal human worth and
autonomy’.28 The first conceptual barrier may be framed as a
26 in C Rautenbach & S Mancuso (eds) In the shade of an African baobab: Tom
Bennett's legacy (2018) 166-167. 
27 Atuahene (n 8) 804.
28 Atuahene 800.
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question: Who is responsible for dignity takings in matrimonial
property disputes? 
2.1 Responsibility for dignity takings
It is too simplistic to offer non-state actors as the sole answer. The
non-living customary law of matrimonial property epitomises ‘the
invisible, constant, and normalised oppression of women’ in socio-
cultural relations.29 Since the state has appropriated to itself
regulatory power over behaviour, it behoves on it to curb all
customary law behaviour which demeans, infantilises and dispossesses
women of marital property. Most constitutions provide for human
rights to bind the state, its agents and private individuals.30 For
example, section 34(1) of the Nigerian Constitution provides that
‘[e]very individual is entitled to respect for the dignity of his person,
and accordingly, no person shall be subject to torture or to inhuman
or degrading treatment’. Despite defaulting to the male pronoun, this
provision protects a woman’s right to dignity, which is violated when
she is kicked out of her matrimonial home and robbed of a share in
her matrimonial property.31 Importantly, she is infantilised when her
agency is denied over marital property which she bought or helped to
acquire with her independent income. For enabling this situation,
both the state and the individuals who rob women of matrimonial
property are liable.
2.2 Is the notion of dignity takings applicable to marriage?
The heading above captures the second conceptual barrier to the
application of dignity takings to matrimonial property division under
customary law. While dignity takings may not apply to a ‘happy’
marriage, the same cannot be said for divorce. In an analytic sense,
the separation of a married woman’s legal status from her husband’s
is of recent origin under the common law legal tradition. Prior to this
separation, the extent to which involuntary property loss constituted
dignity taking under the doctrine of coverture was unclear. In his case
analysis of coverture in the Anglo-American legal system of the late
twentieth century, Hartog rules out coverture as constitutive of dignity
taking.32 He critiques literature arguing that coverture is ‘an inevitable
consequence of marriage, [which] implicitly infantilized women [and]
kept them from being recognized as autonomous adults’.33 He draws
a distinction between marriage as dignity taking and coverture as an
aspect of marriage that leads to dignity taking. Citing reasons such as
29 Atuahene (n 10) 180.
30 See, eg, sec 8(2) of the 1996 Constitution of South Africa, and sec 34(1) of the
1999 Constitution of Nigeria. 
31 UC Isiugo-Abanihe ‘Reproductive motivation and family-size preferences among
Nigerian men’ (1994) 25 Studies in Family Planning 149 at 154.
32 H Hartog ‘Coverture and dignity: A comment’ (2016) 41 Law and Social Inquiry
833.
33 Hartog (n 32) 835.
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love, choice and the cultural respect conferred by marriage, he argues
that marriage does not automatically ‘produce a loss of dignity …
[and is also] the antithesis of an “extraordinary” taking’.34 However,
his focus was on coverture within an ongoing marriage, not as a
divorce doctrine in a society where non-living customary law denies
women’s matrimonial property rights. Importantly, the twentieth
century Anglo-American legal tradition he analysed did not deny
divorced women maintenance or compensation rights. Indeed,
Hartog admits that invocations of ‘coverture would include many
separated wives … suing to require husbands to support them, to
provide for their “necessaries”’.35 Although ‘suing to require
husbands to support them’ indicates some sort of agency, it hints at
action against an infantilised property rights regime. My concern here
is with something much more invidious. One aspect of the problem is
a philosophy of customary law which regards divorcing women as
unworthy of benefiting from property division, irrespective of their
contribution to the acquisition of marital property. The other aspect is
a total absence of a legal platform for redressing this situation. This
combination of official/non-living customary law and an indifferent
legal framework often results in a multi-pronged humiliation of
homelessness, property theft and disrespect of women’s agency over
their contributions to property acquisition. To be clear, these
contributions are made through women’s independent income and
emotional support to their husbands. Such an unreasonable
philosophy clearly infantilises women and, in some cases, could even
be dehumanising. In any case, the rich jurisprudence on domestic
abuse shows that dignity takings can occur in subsisting marriages.
One may argue that dignity takings do not apply to matrimonial
property because some women elect not to contest property during
divorce. In other words, it may be argued that the element of
involuntary property dispossession is not present. This argument,
however, cannot be sustained when one fully considers the structural
barriers and unequal power relations within which matrimonial
property rights are asserted and denied. As Pils’s study of evictions in
China shows, dignity takings also occur when state structures restrict
citizens from mobilising to assert their rights, or when state structures
erect insurmountable barriers that promote property dispossessions.36
Many divorcees told me that they did not bother to contest marital
property, not because they did not want to, but because it would be
in vain. As a long-divorced woman wryly summarised it, ‘I had not
gotten that idea that it [matrimonial property rights] operates in
Nigeria or even in Africa. So, I thought it was only the Europeans that
have that.’37 Arguably, women’s defeatism is induced or exacerbated
by their legally insecure status, while their emotional and financial
34 As above.
35 Hartog (n 32) 837.
36 E Pils ‘Resisting dignity takings in China’ (2016) 41 Law and Social Inquiry 888.
37 Interview with a divorced school principal on 29 July 2014 in Owerri.
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distress negates the voluntariness of their property loss. In fact, the
heartrending circumstances surrounding divorce in Southern Nigeria
epitomise the demeaning socio-cultural position of women under
customary law. The denial of women’s matrimonial property rights,
therefore, qualifies as a dignity taking worthy of dignity restoration. In
this sense, should dignity restoration be state-driven, or could it be
initiated by non-state actors such as family members, community
leaders and women themselves? This question is significant for the
scholarly conceptualisation of dignity restoration.
2.3 Problematic conceptualisation of dignity restoration 
Dignity takings and dignity restoration originally were used in a
vertical sense – that is in the sense of state-initiated property
dispossessions, usually justified by legislation or public purpose. Unlike
the South African context of dispossession within a state-sanctioned
apartheid system, the non-living customary law of matrimonial
property in Southern Nigeria is practised largely by non-state actors.
However, given the total absence of state regulation of customary
marriage and its proprietary consequences, these actors arguably
behave with practically no legal restraint, and in contravention of the
right to human dignity. In this sense, if dignity takings apply to their
conduct, should dignity restoration be the exclusive preserve of the
state and its agents? Regrettably, the present conceptualisation of
dignity restoration indicates state-centricity as it includes the element
of process.38 
Atuahene defines dignity restoration as ‘a remedy that seeks to
provide dispossessed individuals and communities with material
compensation through processes that affirm their humanity and
reinforce their agency’.39 She identifies restitution, redistribution,
reparations and restoration as the constitutive elements of dignity
restoration.40 These elements are, as she affirmed, ‘process-oriented
terms’.41 In my view, however, process is not suitable for involuntary
property losses perpetrated by non-state actors. The requirement of
process in the definition of dignity restoration obviously flows from
the state-centric nature of its original conceptualisation. Fortunately,
Atuahene admits that the occurrence of dignity restoration ‘is context
specific and contingent on a host of factors’.42 In what follows, I show
why the conceptualisation of dignity restoration should be stripped of
its requirement of process. 
By requiring process, the conceptualisation of dignity restoration
implies system, procedure, or mechanism, all of which are attributes
of the state. Arguably, process implies verticality – that is a hierarchical
38 Atuahene (n 8) 57.
39 Atuahene (n 10) 818.
40 Atuahene 802.
41 As above.
42 Atuahene (n 10) 814.
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relationship. There is no reason why dignity restoration should not be
given a horizontal slant to accommodate the increasing realisation
that private actors’ violations of human rights demand asymmetric
solutions.43 Such solutions could circumvent and complement the
slow, bureaucratic officialdom of the state. Accordingly, dignity
restoration in many cases may best be implemented by non-state
actors such as family members, friends, arbitrators and community
leaders. Indeed, divorcing women’s resistance to property deprivation
could constitute dignity restoration, in line with Pils’s case study
showing how acts of resistance against dignity taking could be a form
of dignity restoration.44 In the foregoing context, I redefine dignity
restoration as ‘a remedy that seeks to provide dispossessed individuals
and groups with material compensation in a manner that affirms their
humanity and reinforces their agency’. I now turn to an innovative
analysis of the role of a Nigerian government agency in dignity
restoration for divorcing women.
3 Welfare Department and dignity restoration
The first time an informant stated that ‘some relatives referred me to
Welfare’, it did not strike me as important. I knew ‘Welfare’ is the
colloquial term for the Nigerian Social Welfare Department, but I
assumed that the Department’s role was conciliatory, not
adjudicatory. However, when two other informants mentioned
‘Welfare’, I was compelled to investigate. 
The Welfare Department traces its origins to missionary activities
and colonial policies.45 At the federal level, it operates as a parastatal
under the Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Development.
Elsewhere its name varies.46 It has offices in almost every municipality
in Nigeria, and functions with a policy guide.47 Although it is
mandated to promote the interests of women and children, the depth
of its involvement in matrimonial property disputes is noteworthy. In
January 2015 I visited their offices in two municipalities, observed
their dispute resolution mechanisms, and held individual interviews
and focus group discussions with their directors, deputies and 11
other officials. 
43 M Thornton ‘The cartography of public and private’ in M Thornton (ed) Public and
private: Feminist legal debates (1995) 2; I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights
handbook (2005) 41.
44 Pils (n 36).
45 O Ayodele & PA Edewor ‘Sociology and social work in Nigeria: Characteristics,
collaborations and differences’ (2013) 16 African Sociological Review 48. 
46 Eg, it is called Ministry of Social Welfare and Rehabilitation in Rivers State.
47 This guide is known as ‘Social Development Policy for Nigeria’, a document
adopted in October 1989 and revised in 2004.
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3.1 Procedures of the Welfare Department
From my interaction with divorcees, the Welfare Department is the
first port of call when families, churches or friends of quarrelling
couples fail to resolve matrimonial disputes. There are several reasons
for women’s resort to the Department. The key reasons are
helplessness in the face of the traditional philosophy of matrimonial
property or non-living customary law, faith in the strong, coercive
shadow of state law, and, of course, the success stories of other
divorcees. Curiously, women rarely seek police protection because of
strong patriarchal perceptions of women’s rights and the police’s
reputation for corruption. It goes without saying that recourse to the
Department is made in the context of marriage under both customary
law and state law, in this case the Marriage Act.48 These double
marriages are common in Nigeria, mainly due to the lack of statutory
protection for customary marriages and the failure by non-living
customary law to recognise women’s matrimonial property rights.49
This non-recognition encourages normative shopping – that is,
reliance on another legal order to utilise its perceived benefits.50 Thus,
the Welfare Department stands at an important intersection between
customary law and state laws of marriage. As some of the
Department’s senior officials explained in a focus group discussion,
the following describes their dispute resolution procedure:51
They [disputants] first write a statement as a report. After that, we issue an
invitation letter to the respondent. Then we fix – two weeks or three weeks
hearing date. On that day, the parties are expected to come with their
witnesses. The report of the complainant will be read out openly to the
floor to discuss. After that, we ask the respondent whether the statement is
right or not. When he accepts, the case will start. After the first hearing …
we may decide to adjourn to calm the situation. 
When a matrimonial dispute is not resolved, the Department proceeds
to make varying separation-related orders. An official summarised it as
follows:
48 The Marriage Act, Cap 218, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990; Cap M6, LFN
2004.
49 M Onoka Family law (2003) 143; O Agbede ‘Recognition of double marriage in
Nigerian law’ (1968) 17 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 735; AC Diala
‘Legal pluralism and social change: Insights from matrimonial property rights in
Nigeria’ in C Rautenbach & S Mancuso (eds) Festschrift of Thomas Bennett (2018);
Ohochuku v Ohockuwu (1960) 1 ALL ER 253; Jadesimi v Okotie Eboh (1996) 2
NWLR 128 147-148.
50 ES Nwauche ‘Legal pluralism and access to land in Nigeria’ in H Mostert &
TW Bennett (eds) Pluralism and development: Studies in access to property in Africa
(2012) 59-60 70; A Griffiths ‘Reconfiguring law: An ethnographic perspective
from Botswana’ (1998) 23 Law and Social Inquiry 587.
51 Focus group discussions held with 14 officials on 13 and 14 January 2015 in
Owerri. The arbitration procedure was explained by Mr Chidi Ucheghara, Senior
Social Welfare Officer, Ms Antonia Nwambara, Assistant Social Welfare Officer, and
a female official who spoke anonymously on 14 January 2015. The quotes of
officials who requested anonymity are used without referencing. 
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[If a case] is not resolved amicably and they didn’t agree to stay together,
we may ask the man to pay something to the woman as compensation.
Then, if they have issues – ie children – that are underage, we will ask the
man to take care of the children. That is school, feeding, and health wise.
Then the man will secure accommodation for them, because they have to
live somewhere … they cannot just be thrown out …
The courts treat the decisions of the Department as arbitral awards
and, when required, judges summon its officials to give evidence.
Although they have no formal enforcement powers, when the need
arises Department officials use force to protect the best interests of
children:
Where they [couple] don’t take our advice, they can go to a higher level
like taking it to court … But in some cases that they don’t need to go to
court and the man does not want to adhere to our instructions like paying
maintenance for the upkeep of the children … after carrying out
investigation and we find out that the man just does not want to provide
for the children’s upkeep, we use the police to get the man to comply.
Other than ordering maintenance and custody of children, the
Welfare Department also makes compensation orders in favour of
women. The nature of these orders is dependent on the
circumstances of the case concerned. The Department’s activities
indicate it as an agent of dignity restoration. 
3.2 Dignity restoration agents?
It is not clear whether the activities of the Department fit the present
conceptualisation of dignity restoration. As explained, dignity
restoration is a remedy for dignity takings, which occurs in contexts of
property dispossession that involve the ‘dehumanisation or
infantilisation of the dispossessed’.52 While dehumanisation denotes
disrespect or non-recognition of a person’s humanity, infantilisation
denotes the restriction of an adult’s autonomy and full capacity for
independent action. In other words, infantilisation involves the
treatment of an otherwise fully rational and capable adult as a minor.
For divorcing women who are infantilised in the course of matrimonial
property division, ‘providing material compensation is not enough
because they lost more than their property – they were also deprived
of their dignity’.53 Accordingly, they require dignity restoration
beyond mere material compensation. While the activities of the
Welfare Department clearly provide material compensation in a
reasonably respectful or dignity-restoring manner, the element of
process is not met. For a start, the Department intervenes in
matrimonial property disputes on invitation. Also, it has no formal
mechanism for handling matrimonial property disputes. They merely
act on the best interests of children principle, from which they
extrapolate or submerge a best interests of women principle.
52 Atuahene (n 8) 796. 
53 As above.
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Accordingly, their arbitral awards are made on a case-by-case basis,
which potentially leaves their decisions open to abuse by corrupt
officials. In effect, Department officials do not adjudicate with a
dignity-restoration mindset. In other words, they do not set out to
redress divorcing women’s property dispossession with a view to
remedying the non-living customary law philosophy that infantilises
women. In the context of the present conceptualisation of dignity,
therefore, dignity restoration in the Department’s arbitral orders may
be regarded as accidental. The cases below demonstrate the complex
circumstances of dignity takings, which make it difficult for process to
be an element of dignity restoration. 
3.3 Manifestations of dignity taking 
To understand the circumstances of dignity takings in matrimonial
property disputes, I must first explain marriage gifts, which constitute
a key aspect of property tussles. Marriage gifts are items given to the
bride at the time of her marriage to assist her transition into the
marital journey. These items are not to be confused with the gifts
brought by a groom as part of the requirements of bride wealth.54 In
the past, marriage gifts consisted exclusively of cooking utensils and
items of adornment such as jewellery, clothes and sandals. They
presently include modern gadgets such as cars, refrigerators,
television sets, dishwashers and furniture. 
There are two broad categories of marriage gifts. The first category
comprises items given to a bride by her parents and extended family.
The second category comprises gifts given to the couple by their
friends. This category may also include gifts given to the bride by her
friends specifically or generally for her comfort. Examples are cars,
laptop computers, household furniture, kitchen utensils, business
equipment, and items of adornment such as clothes and jewellery. As
explained below, this second category presents problems during
marriage dissolution, given the difficulty of determining whether such
gifts are meant for the couple or only for the comfort of the woman.
The following representative stories from pseudonymised informants
reveal how divorcees, traditional leaders, NGOs, priests and Welfare
Department officials treat women’s matrimonial property rights in and
outside the courts in Southern Nigeria.55 Importantly, they show the
cultural, legal and psychological issues within which unequal power
relations and dignity takings occur. 
3.3.1 Quality of legal services
Janet and John married in 1992. They had four children. John, a
businessman, accused Janet of infidelity. Janet, a civil servant, accused
him of violent domestic abuse. John eventually chased her away from
54 J Osom ‘Moral implication of high bride-price in Nigeria: Annang case survey’ PhD
thesis, Pontificia Universitas Lateranensis, 1989 34.
55 In all these stories, I have protected the identity of informants with pseudonyms.
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their matrimonial home and petitioned for divorce in a customary
court. Initially, both parties were not legally represented. Janet told
the court she wanted custody of her children, even though she did
not want the marriage to be dissolved. She briefed her lawyer to claim
her marriage gifts and seek maintenance for herself and her children.
She later requested compensation for the furniture she had acquired,
her contributions to the house they built in the village, and the
200 000 naira she contributed to the purchase of their car.56 Due to
her lawyer’s incompetence, her motion, although properly filed, was
not argued. Thus, it was struck out and judgment was granted in
favour of John, including custody of their children. The court also
issued an order restraining Janet from bearing John’s surname.
Following family advice ‘to wait and see if the [love] charm used to
bewitch [John] would fall away’, Janet did not appeal the judgment.
She also did not approach the Welfare Department. Seven years on
she is still waiting and has recovered no properties from the marriage. 
3.3.2 Disparate power relations
Sarah was forced by her parents to marry Samuel in 1999 after she
had fallen pregnant. They had two children. Samuel’s family gave
Sarah a parcel of land as a marriage gift. With her family’s help, she
set up a catering business, and helped Samuel to acquire household
property such as a refrigerator and a television set. She also
contributed significantly in building a three-bedroomed house. In
2008 Samuel accused her of prostitution and violently evicted her
from their matrimonial home. A few days later Sarah returned to her
matrimonial home with her brother to take her business materials. She
did not take her clothes and items of adornment as she hoped to
reconcile with her husband. A year later Samuel remarried and sent
their two children to work as domestic helpers in the city. Following a
vicious custody battle involving alleged kidnappings and the use of
armed vigilantes, Sarah petitioned their local Welfare Department,
who awarded her custody. Samuel refused to comply with the order,
allegedly using a combination of threats, bribery and intimidation to
avoid enforcement of the custody order. Sarah then petitioned for
divorce and custody in a customary court. Samuel showed up with a
marriage certificate and claimed that he had undergone a statutory
law marriage with Sarah. The court declined jurisdiction, stating that a
customary marriage became subsumed in a later statutory marriage.
Eventually, Sarah remarried and used direct conciliation to obtain
custody of her children. Largely due to Samuel’s violent nature and
the non-living customary law of matrimonial property, neither Sarah
nor her family members contested the couple’s household properties.
In fact, Sarah never returned to take her clothes, and Samuel’s new
wife allegedly started wearing them.
56 At the time of this interview (January 2015), one US dollar = 160 naira.
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3.3.3 Futility of formal law
Gift, a high school teacher, married Gerald, a civil servant, in 2001.
They had a child. In 2008 co-habitation stopped after Gerald had
used a machete to evict her from their matrimonial home. Three
months later Gift returned with her brother, attempting to retrieve her
belongings and her baby’s clothes. They were unsuccessful as Gerald
had changed the locks. Gift later picked up some of her belongings
from a neighbour’s house where Gerald had dropped them. He looted
Gift’s shop, claiming that everything they owned belonged to him.
Following the failure of several family reconciliation efforts, Gift
headed to the Welfare Department. 
Gerald initially refused to appear, eventually being compelled by
the police to appear. Welfare officials awarded custody of the (then)
three year-old baby to Gift. They ordered Gerald to provide
accommodation for Gift and pay 6 000 naira as monthly maintenance
for the baby. He refused to heed the decision and on several occasions
tried to kidnap the baby. In 2011 Gift petitioned for marriage
dissolution, custody and maintenance of the child. She did not
request maintenance for herself as she loathed Gerald and believed
that she could take care of herself. Gerald failed to contest the
petition, had judgment given against him, and refused to comply
with the court order for maintenance. Gift did not enforce the
judgment. In her words, ‘I cannot force him to train [educate] his own
child.’ 
3.3.4 Litigation fatigue and resource constraints
Grace’s parents forced her to marry Greg in 1996. They had four
children. In 2006 Greg instructed her to leave the city and return to
her parents in the village as he wanted to bring back his first wife.
Grace, who was unaware that Greg had married two women before
her, refused to leave. Several unsuccessful family mediations occurred.
Church officials advised Greg to secure accommodation for Grace and
educate her children. One morning in 2008, Greg used a lorry and a
van filled with police officers to forcefully repatriate Grace to her
parents’ house. A month later Grace reported him to the Welfare
Department, who made the same orders as the church. Greg agreed
to obey the order by a certain date. In the meantime, Grace went to
the city and ‘rescued’ her children who were being ill-treated by
Greg’s first wife. 
A few days prior to the deadline of the Department’s order, Greg
petitioned for divorce and custody in a customary court. Assisted by a
human rights lawyer, Grace successfully counter-claimed for custody,
payment of her children’s tuition, monthly maintenance of 100 000
naira for the children, monthly maintenance of 50 000 naira for
herself, and 5 000 000 naira ‘damages’ for ‘untold hardship’ and
‘deceit’. Following intense litigation, the court granted Grace’s
extraordinary claims for dignity restoration. 
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Greg appealed, lost, and appealed again. The case stalemated. The
human rights lawyer moved on. Tired of the emotional, physical and
financial drain of litigation, Grace reached an out of court settlement,
wherein Greg agreed to fund the children’s education and Grace
agreed to abandon all other claims. She took only her ‘personal
belongings’ out of the marriage.
3.3.5 Self-restoration of dignity
At the age of 15 Sandra’s parents forced her to marry Simon, a
wealthy businessman in his fifties. The couple resided in Simon’s two-
storey building in a peri-urban area and had three children. Simon
had earlier married two women at different times and ‘driven them
away’ after some years. For nearly a decade he allegedly used Sandra
as a slave, while failing to fulfil the financial promises he had made to
her parents, which notably included building them a house.
Emboldened by age, socialisation and education, Sandra began
resisting her husband’s abuse. Problems ensued. A now aged Simon
accused her of infidelity, theft and cruelty, and attempted to use a rifle
to evict her from their matrimonial home. She seized the rifle and
instead evicted him. He petitioned for divorce in a customary court
and the reclaim of their matrimonial residence. He obtained judgment
allegedly by fraud, and Sandra’s lawyer quashed it on appeal. While
the matter was being retried at another customary court, Simon died.
Family members divided his estate according to ‘kitchens’.57 They
gave Sandra the two-storey building she was occupying with her
children. Simon’s two widows received his other properties, notably
buildings. During her interview Sandra admitted that the widows
would have received no properties if they had no male child. She
decided to ‘take matters’ into her our hands mainly because of her
education, socialisation, and Simon’s unfulfilled promises to her
parents.
3.3.6 Family involvement in dignity restoration
Linda, a teacher, married Linus, a lecturer, in 1991. Both hailed from
the same town and lived in the city. The marriage produced two boys
and a girl. After 12 years Linus’s repeated domestic assaults on Linda
compelled the couple to live apart. Linda obtained access to their
children with the help of the Welfare Department. Unable to reconcile
the parties at one final family meeting attended by 12 persons, the
couple were permitted to separate. The families ordered Linus to
regularly pay ‘something for the upkeep of the kids … especially for
their schooling’. They made no order for Linda’s maintenance, nor did
she demand it. Similarly, they did not order a division of the couple’s
car, house and household furniture. Linda merely took her ‘personal
57 Division according to kitchens or ‘houses’ means division of a deceased’s estate
according to the number of his wives, especially those with a male child. See,
generally, DSP Cronje & J Heaton South African family law (2010) 210-211.
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effects – boxes, dresses, [and] some of the kitchen utensils’. After a
period of refuge in her uncle’s house, she obtained her own
apartment. Unlike Linus, she never remarried and still bears his
surname. Following their non-judicial divorce, she never claimed
matrimonial property, even after Linus died four years later. 
3.4 Dignity restoration in matrimonial property disputes
The circumstances in which many women leave their matrimonial
homes in the above stories obviously discourage them from
contesting marital property. More than anything else, the unequal
power relations evident in these stories, coupled with women’s loss of
their matrimonial home, contribute to dignity takings. There are
emotional, cultural and even religious values attached to property,
including matrimonial property. In the case of the matrimonial home,
these values sometimes outweigh economic values. As Atuahene
argues, ‘a home is more than a physical structure; it is a claim to a
specific space that places a person in proximity to particular people
with whom they form relationships’.58 The question is whether
dignity restoration applies to matrimonial property disputes in
Nigeria. I argue that it applies if the element of process is removed
from the definition of dignity restoration. Women’s dignity may be
restored through property division, monetary compensation and,
above all, the legislative recognition of women’s matrimonial property
rights. While process may be involved in some of these measures, it
need not be a requisite element of dignity restoration. 
In the remainder of the article I reveal the shadow of state law in
the privileging of gender, class, and dignity in matrimonial property
division. In so doing, I draw attention to the adaptive influence of
state law on social fields involving customary law.
4 Dignity restoration in the shadow of legal pluralism
As hinted in part 3, other than customary courts and the 1999
Nigerian Constitution, I did not know that a state organ such as the
Welfare Department was influential in people’s application of
customary law.59 In what follows I analyse the creative ways in which
the Department is involved in dignity restoration for divorced women
dispossessed of property by the non-living customary law of
matrimonial property. 
4.1 Use of receipts
Obviously, the means through which dignity restoration can be
achieved are not just context-specific but also debatable. The contexts
include ‘the political and economic power of the victims, the level of
58 Atuahene (n 10) 172.
59 Indeed, my original interview plan did not include the Welfare Department.
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political will among powerbrokers’60 and, in this article, the legal
framework. The first key tool in the Department’s recovery of marriage
gifts and properties bought by women are purchase receipts. This
reliance on receipts as evidence of matrimonial property contribution
is influenced by judicial trends.61 In Janet’s case above, the judges
ruled that it was insufficient for her to allege contributions to
matrimonial property without tendering evidence. Traditional rulers,
clergy and staff of NGOs affirmed that women may claim matrimonial
property with receipts showing that the property was bought in their
own name. The problem, as a female Department official said, is that
‘when making receipts, [women] use their husband’s surname. When
there is any dispute, the husband will now claim the property.’ The
use of receipts is because non-living customary law regards women’s
property rights as derived from their husbands.62 A Department
official expressed it as follows: 
In [non-living] customary law, the woman is a loser as far as divorce is
concerned. She goes home almost empty-handed. The man owns the
property except where the woman bought certain things with her own
money. In such a case, she has to prove that those things really belong to
her because the [non-living] customary law says that the man owns the
woman and all her property. If she has no receipts, the community
[extended family] may, out of pity, grant some part of what the woman is
asking for …
There is near unanimity among my informants that a divorcing
woman should exit marriage with the properties she received as
marriage gifts from her parents. However, she generally forgoes
properties received from friends in her marital name, unless her
husband or family members allow her to take them. This is regardless
of whether these properties were given by her own friends. Since they
bear the marital name, usually the man’s family name, they are
presumed to belong to the man. In this clear denial of women’s
agency in marital property acquisition, the Department makes
significant interventions, as I explain below. 
The couple is usually asked to list their properties and provide
evidence of acquisition. Where the purchase receipt of a marriage gift,
or indeed any matrimonial property, discloses that it was acquired in
the woman’s name during the subsistence of the marriage, the
Department decides in the woman’s favour. An official, Mr Emeka
Okpara, explained it as folllows:63
60 Atuahene (n 8) 814.
61 Eg, in Onwuchekwa v Onwuchekwa (1991) 5 NWLR (Pt 194) 739, the Court of
Appeal held that a wife must tender ‘sufficient proof’ such as ‘receipts’ showing
her contribution to matrimonial property. See also Amadi v Nwosu (1992) NWLR
(Pt 241) 273; (1992) LPELR-442 (SC).
62 In Onwuchekwa (n 61), the Court of Appeal surprisingly confirmed an Isuikwuato
(Abia State) custom, which holds that a wife and her properties are owned by her
husband.
63 Interview conducted on 13 January 2015 in Owerri.
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First, we ask them to list the property. If it is property that should come
with receipts, for instance, like cars, houses, and land, in that type of case,
we will ask them to produce receipt. If that receipt has only that person’s
name, then it automatically belongs to that person. But if it is written to
the woman’s name, we will give it to her, because definitely, it is her that
bought the thing with her money. 
Where the property is acquired in the couple’s name, usually the
man’s name or family name, the Department is inclined to rule
equitably, or in the woman’s favour. Their decision is influenced by
factors such as income capacity, the quantum of properties, custody
of the children, and fault. An official in a focus group discussion stated
without contradiction:
If it is joint property, we check the numbers – for example foam [mattress]
– if the woman is seeking to separate from the man, you don’t say ‘go and
lie on the floor’. You check the number of the foams. If it is two, let me say
for instance, you give the woman one and the man will collect one. And
more especially if … the children are under age, you don’t allow the
children to sleep on the floor … Even if the foam is one, you give the
children that foam … because the child is our main priority in handling
matrimonial matters.
This official’s statement reveals the influence of the best interests of
the child principle in the Department’s arbitral decisions. This
principle, which forms part of the foundational values of customary
law,64 is the second key element in matrimonial property division after
divorce.
4.2 Children’s connection
Department officials make special efforts to uphold the best interests
of the child in their decisions on custody. This is in furtherance of
legislation such as the Child Rights Act of 2003 and the Children and
Young Persons Act of 1943, as variously amended in the eastern,
western and northern regions of Nigeria. The Department’s efforts are
also a recognition of the foundational value of customary law which
holds that a man must care for his family. In this light, the best
interests of the child principle demonstrates resonance between
customary law and state law. As two officials put it, ‘we [also] rely our
judgments on the law of the land – that is the customary law ... the
Igbo tradition values children – whether male or female child’.65 
Although the traditional philosophy of customary law ascribes
custody to men, the best interests of the child principle is shifting this
philosophy. In explaining this shift, Mr Chidi Ucheghara stated:66 
In customary law, the man and the woman both own the children. But
custody depends on the age. If the child is like zero to six years, custody
64 See n 14.
65 Interviews with Mr Emeka Okpara, Social Welfare Officer, and a female official who
spoke anonymously at Owerri on 13 January 2015.
66 Interview with Mr Chidi Ucheghara, Senior Social Welfare Officer on 14 January
2015 at Owerri. 
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will be awarded to the mother. But if the child is up to twelve years, the
child can be under the custody of his father. 
The stress on the phrase ‘can be’ shows that custody is no longer the
automatic preserve of men. Given the huge clientele of the Welfare
Department, it is obvious that 
their attitude to custody is contributing to the emergence of a living
customary law of child custody. One may then ask, ‘What about childless
couples?’ The next section discusses the motivations behind the
Department’s dignity restoration attitude to childless divorcees. 
4.3 Dignity restoration for childless women 
Ordinarily, non-living customary law does not recognise maintenance
for divorced women except, as seen above, through the duty to care
for children. Indeed, some of my divorcee informants seemed
surprised at the possibility of obtaining maintenance. Others credit
the Welfare Department for its increasing orders relating to
maintenance. For the Department the issue is not whether divorced
women are entitled to maintenance. The issue is whether their orders
should be termed compensation or maintenance. This dilemma is an
aspect of the gendered and psychological realities of divorce. For the
Department, maintenance is a regular sum paid to a spouse by the
other. Conversely, compensation is a lump sum paid by a spouse to
enable the other to set up a business or make up for the financial loss
caused by the divorce. Compensation obviously is a muted
recognition that divorce in Southern Nigeria usually involves
involuntary property loss which requires remedial action. 
Furthermore, the Department’s compensatory orders acknowledge
unequal power relations between men and women. Maintenance
implies an element of control on the part of the person providing it.
As an official explained, ‘If you say maintenance, that means you will
even house her, and monitor the house. If she brings a man there,
you will know and go there to throw the man away.’ A key reason
why the Department prefers compensation to maintenance is the
incredible emotional distress involved in divorce cases. Several
informants affirmed that they would never accept maintenance from
their former husband as it would prevent them from having ‘proper
closure’.67 Some only accept maintenance on behalf of their children
because they cannot raise the children on their own. They generally
prefer not to ask for any financial relief unless they cannot help it.
Indeed, a study found only three judicial decisions in which women
demanded compensation after divorce.68 In Grace’s case study above,
she termed it ‘damages’ for ‘untold hardship’ and ‘deceit’. 
67 Obiora’s probe of attitudes towards financial awards during divorce suggests that
women ‘found it contradictory to supplicate for help from former husbands who
had maltreated and/or betrayed them’. See LA Obiora ‘Kindling the domain of
social reform through law: A case study’ (1995) 13 Third World Legal Studies FN
65.
68 Diala (n 14). 
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Department officials take the issue of compensatory orders
seriously. If a man refuses to comply with an order of compensation,
they could use law enforcement agents to enforce it, or assist the
woman to institute court proceedings. Remarkably, compensatory
orders are made irrespective of whether children are involved. Mr
Okpara explained it as follows:69 
If the woman is without a child or children, you don’t pay any
maintenance to her. But rather, we advise the man to compensate the
woman so that the woman will use the money to be maintaining herself. If
you ask the man to be maintaining the woman, it then means that you are
asking the man to be controlling the woman because he who pays the
piper, dictates the tune … If you have advised the man to pay
compensation and he refuses to pay it, you now apply force to take it.
The amounts of compensatory orders made by the Department are
usually dependent on the circumstances of the divorce. These
circumstances include the financial status of the couple; the extent of
the woman’s contribution to the matrimonial property; the party at
fault in the divorce; the length of the marriage; and the possibilities of
the woman remarrying. Mr Mbawuike Richard explained:70 
If the man was instrumental to the dissolution of that marriage, under
customary law, there is nothing that binds the man to maintain the
woman. She just goes. But here in Social Welfare Department, we ask the
man to compensate the woman – give her some money. The sum is
dependent on the status of the man. So, we ask the man to give the
woman a sum, which she can use to rehabilitate herself.
The most striking aspect of the Department’s interventions in
matrimonial property disputes is the context-specific nature of its
decisions. Their case-by-case approach, which resembles common law
judges’ approach,71 makes it difficult for process to form an essential
element of the definition of the dignity restoration. In the concluding
part of this article I argue that the Department’s activities demonstrate
dialogue between state law and customary law, which aids the
emergence of a living customary law of matrimonial property in
Southern Nigeria.
5 Significance of state law’s dialogue with customary 
law
In non-judicial divorce, the Welfare Department increasingly orders
men to give financial compensation to women. Its compensatory
orders are dependent on the circumstances of each case, notably
fault, the woman’s contribution to the matrimonial property, and the
earning status of the parties. Not only do they routinely award
69 Interview held on 13 January 2015 in Owerri.
70 Interview held on 14 January 2015 in Owerri.
71 Diala (n 14).
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custody to women, but these officials also order men to pay
maintenance for the children. For deviating from the non-living
customary law of matrimonial property, these orders, which have a
multiplier effect on normative behaviour in social fields, constitute
adaptations of customs to socio-economic changes. 
People’s adaptations to socio-economic changes produce living
customary law when individuals in a social field attach a sense of
obligation to new practices or adaptations of existing practices.72
Instructively, Welfare Department officials usually belong to the same
normative social field as estranged couples. They therefore act with
full awareness of the non-living customary law of matrimonial
property. Their deviations rightly acknowledge the dissonance
between the agrarian origins of matrimonial property rights and the
application of these rights in modern conditions. They recognise that
women contribute to the acquisition of matrimonial property through
their independent income. They also recognise that marriage gifts
have moved beyond kitchen utensils to include modern gadgets such
as houses, cars, televisions and refrigerators. Significantly, these
gadgets are not only bought by the woman’s family, but also by the
couple’s friends. The Department’s interventions therefore are positive
steps towards dignity restoration for divorced women. Their
interventions are also significant for legal pluralism in Nigeria.
As explained in part two, there are no statutory regulations of
customary law rules of succession, marriage and divorce in Nigeria.
There is also no provision in the matrimonial legal framework for
marriage in community of property.73 Because of these legislative
lacunae, ‘the creation of a [customary law] marriage has no immediate
effect on the parties’ property rights’.74 My informants unanimously
affirmed that ‘a woman is a loser’ under the customary law of divorce.
The word ‘loser’ is usually used in humiliating contexts in Nigeria. It
accurately depicts the legal situation of women, who have little
financial protection after divorce, irrespective of the type of their
marriage and the extent of their contributions to matrimonial
property.75 Unfortunately, the Nigerian Supreme Court is yet to
recognise women’s beneficial interests in matrimonial property.76 As it
has been severally held in divorce proceedings, women cannot lead
evidence of jointly-owned properties by showing acts of ownership
72 Diala (n 13) 150-151.
73 Community of property denotes a marriage of equal property benefits and loss.
74 G Woodman ‘Judicial development of customary law: The case of marriage law in
Ghana and Nigeria’ (1977) 14 University of Ghana Law Journal 127.
75 E Chianu ‘The horse and ass yoked: Legal principles to aid the weak in a world of
unequals’ Inaugural Lecture, University of Benin, 2007 153-154. 
76 In Onwuchekwa (n 61) the Court of Appeal held that a wife must show ‘sufficient
proof’ of her contribution to matrimonial property. See also Amadi v Nwosu (1992)
NWLR (Pt 241) 273; (1992) LPELR-442 (SC).
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such as paintings and improvements.77 In fact, judges used to regard
women as inheritable chattel, while legislative lacunae encourage men
to dispossess women of their matrimonial property contributions.78
Since non-living customary law regards married women’s property
rights as subsumed in those of their husbands, Nigeria’s non-
regulation of matrimonial property robs divorced women of a legal
platform to contest property.79 The absence of this legal platform
encourages involuntary property loss and infantilisation, the core
elements of dignity takings. 
The significance of dignity takings in matrimonial property is
accentuated by women’s tendencies to acquire property in their
partners’ names because of their desire to marry or remain married. As
studies elsewhere indicate,80 this tendency is not peculiar to Nigeria.
From my interactions with divorcees, women appear to be more
committed to marriage stability than men, thereby preventing them
from taking measures to safeguard their financial wellbeing in case of
divorce. This situation makes it imperative for Nigeria’s legal
framework to provide for matrimonial property rights. In the same
way involuntary property loss ‘can deprive people of dignity’,81 the
legislative affirmation of matrimonial property rights can restore
women’s dignity as individuals with full agency and equal partners in
the marriage enterprise. Similarly, judicial or administrative actions,
which affirm women’s rights to matrimonial property, constitute
dignity affirmation. Accordingly, the property division and
compensatory orders of the Welfare Department demonstrates dignity
restoration for divorced women. 
Furthermore, the Department’s adjudicatory orders reveal dialogue
between state law and customary law. This dialogue is significant for
legal pluralism because living customary law emerges from people’s
adaptation of customs to socio-economic changes.82 An adaptation
viewpoint fits the notion of dignity takings in matrimonial property,
since the application of customary law must keep pace with
contemporary ideas and attitudes. Notions of equality, mutual respect
and autonomy are inconsistent with the non-living customary law of
77 The Court reasons that such improvements do not divest the property of its
original character of family ownership. See, eg, Rabiu v Absi (1996) 7 NWLR (Pt
462) 505 SC (69-70). 
78 Aileru v Anibi (1952) 20 NLR 45; Akinnubi v Akinnubi (1997) 2 NWLR (Pt 486) 144;
Folami v Cole (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt 133) 445; Amusa v Olawumi (2002) 12 NWLR (Pt
780) 30. 
79 Eg, see A Oyajobi ‘Better protection for women and children’ in A Kalu &
Y Osinbajo (eds) Women and children under the Nigerian law (1990) 29; PO Kuye
‘Rights of women under customary law’ in Y Osinbajo & A Kalu (eds) Towards a
restatement of Nigerian customary laws (1991).
80 See, eg, AM Richardson ‘Women’s inheritance rights in Africa: The need to
integrate cultural understanding and legal reform’ (2004) 11 Human Rights Brief
19-22; LH Fincher Leftover women: The resurgence of gender inequality in China
(2014) 3.
81 Atuahene (n 10) 173.
82 Diala (n 13).
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matrimonial property. When this law is applied without consideration
for changing forms of household property and women’s independent
income, dignity takings occur. Given the notoriety of double marriage
and the large number of women who patronise the Department,83
their compensatory and child custody orders are positive normative
influences on the customary law of matrimonial property. As shown
below, these influences question an antipodal approach to legal
pluralism and, simultaneously, encourage legal integration.
5.1 Inspiration for legal integration 
More than a century has passed since legal transplants occurred in
Nigeria and other post-colonial societies. In this period, however, no
significant effort has been made to develop a jurisprudence which
blends customary law ‘with modern Western law and institutions in an
appropriate mix’.84 Customary law is still perceived as inherently
antithetical to state law, especially the Bill of Rights.85 However, this
need not be so, given that customary law is flexible, adapts to
changing social and economic conditions, and possesses foundational
values which inform and guide its flexibility. 
My field encounters in Southern Nigeria reveal similarities between
the foundational values of customary law and some aspects of state
law. For example, the family head’s duty of care under customary law
resonates with the duties of an intestate administrator. The value of
humanness under customary law resonates with the right to human
dignity under state law. The need to preserve the ancestral home
arguably resonates with state laws on cultural heritage. The value of
collective liability under customary law resonates with liability under
Anglo-Saxon law, which eventually morphed into state law.86 In the
context of legal integration, therefore, customary law’s values of
humanness and duty of care to the family can be extrapolated into
legislation not only recognising women’s matrimonial property rights,
but also the spousal right to maintenance or compensation after
divorce. Such recognition would affirm women’s dignity as equal
partners in the marriage enterprise. This is where the Welfare
Department provides a model for legal pluralistic dialogue.
83 More than two-thirds of the interviewed divorcees passed through Social Welfare
mediation. Nearly all others had contemplated using their services.
84 D Weisbrot ‘Papua New Guinea’s indigenous jurisprudence and the legacy of
colonialism’ (1988) 10 University of Hawaii Law Review 30-31.
85 The disdainful treatment of customary law by colonial authorities probably
contributes to its subordinate status in African legal systems.
86 F Pollock & FW Maitland The history of English law before the time of Edward I
(1895); TF Plunkett Concise history of the English law (1956) (showing how
security, justice, oaths, marriage, wardship and succession were all regulated by
the law of kinship).
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6 Conclusion 
The Nigerian government indirectly contributes to the denial of
women’s matrimonial property rights by failing to statutorily regulate
the proprietary consequences of a customary marriage. This failure
brings the state within a complicit human rights relationship with
customary law actors who deny women’s matrimonial property rights,
dispossess them of property, deny their economic and emotional
agency, and thereby infantilise them. I have argued that these
tripartite elements amount to dignity takings. 
I have also argued that the requirement of process in the definition
of dignity restoration hinders remedial measures for women
humiliated by the non-living customary law of matrimonial property
division. These measures may be best implemented in an asymmetric
manner devoid of process. Accordingly, I have redefined dignity
restoration as a remedy that seeks to provide dispossessed individuals
and groups with material compensation in a manner that affirms their
humanity and reinforces their agency. The removal of process from
the definition of dignity restoration accommodates the context-
specific nature of property dispossession perpetrated by non-state
actors. 
Even though the conflict of laws in Africa encourages an antipodal
approach to legal pluralism in mainstream scholarship, I have focused
on dialogue between state law and customary law. I have shown how
a government agency, the Social Welfare Department, is influencing
normative behaviour through arbitral orders that contravene
traditional perceptions of the customary law of matrimonial property.
In prosecuting its statutory mandate to promote the best interests of
women and children, the Department routinely awards custody of
children to women using the best interests of the child principle. It
also divides matrimonial property and orders men to pay maintenance
or compensation to their estranged spouses. Given the lacunae in
Nigeria’s legal framework on the proprietary consequences of
marriage, these arbitral orders could constitute dignity restoration in
the sense I have defined it. The Department’s quasi-judicial orders
demonstrate the dialogic intersection of state law and customary law
on normative behaviour in social fields. These intersections bode well
for legal integration in Nigeria. 
